

# Religion the State and International Society



معهد إبراهيم أبو لغود للدراسات الدولية  
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies



BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY

# Contents

## English Papers

### The Politics of Christian Zionism

Dr. Naim Ateek ..... 5

### The Danish Cartoon Controversy: Understanding the Politics of Culture Talk

Mahmood Mamdani ..... 15

### Religion-State Relations and Political Transformation In Turkey

Baskin Oran ..... 25

#### كلمة رئيس جامعة بيرزيت

د. نبيل قسيس ..... ٥

#### حول موضوع المؤتمر الحادي عشر

د. مجدي المالكي ..... ٧

#### الدين والعلاقة مع الآخر - إطار نظري سوسيولوجي

حسن لدادة ..... ١٣

#### الدين والديمقراطية - الحالة الإسرائيلية

د. عزمي بشارة ..... ٢٧

#### فرنسا والإسلام

ألان غريش ..... ٣٩

#### حماس: مسيرة الوصول إلى السلطة

د. علي الجرباوي ..... ٤٥

#### العولمة والأصولية

د. عبد الكريم البرغوثي ..... ٥٥

## Religion-State Relations and Political Transformation In Turkey

*Baskin Oran\**

This is my first visit on this land and I am most pleased to be here on the invitation of the Birzeit University of the Palestinians.

### A Note on Terminology

I will start with a note on terminology in order to know exactly what we will discuss in a "special" field where not everything can be taken as a matter-of-fact. We have at least four terms here to deal with which are the Laicism, Laicity, Laic, and Laicist; Secularism, Secularity, Secular, and Revolution from Above as well as Dialectics.

Secularism (from Latin *sæculum* meaning century; therefore: contemporary) is a term generally used in English speaking and Protestant countries. It generally means the policy of separation of Church and State. Secularity is a qualification of the society; a secular society is one where sovereignty is based on a temporal (e.g., nation) instead of a spiritual (e.g., God) concept.

Laicism (from Latin *laicus*: a non-ecclesiastical person) a term generally used in Catholic and French-speaking countries is a policy of the State aiming to create a secular society. Therefore, "Laic" is a qualification of the State. Laicity a term rarely used could be understood as secularity. Laicist which is even less used could be interpreted as a fervent laicism policy.

---

\*Professor of Political Science, Ankara University, Turkey.

The term laicism is alien to secular societies. These predominantly Protestant societies have either subdued the Church and pushed it to its spiritual sphere by a long and effective struggle led by the temporal power (the case of England in particular), or they have nothing to fear of the Church because they historically by-passed Feudalism as a socio-economic system, and therefore they have never experienced Religion as their "cohesion ideology" and God as their "focus of supreme loyalty" (the white colon regimes like the USA, Australia, Canada, etc.)<sup>1</sup>.

Laicism in the French experience means the heavy hand of the State over Religion<sup>2</sup>. It stems from the historic supremacy of the Catholic Church during The Middle Ages and the successful fight of the French bourgeoisie against it. This is also the Turkish definition of it, although the origins of the two definitions differ a lot; the Turkish definition stems from the historic supremacy of the State over Religion not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in the larger Middle Eastern region. The Turkish Republic inherited it from the Ottomans, and the Ottomans inherited it from Byzantium. The Ottoman Emperor (Sultan) needed the *fatwa* of the Cheik-ul Islam (the head of the Ottoman religious system) to behead a subject, but in case he couldn't get it all he needed was to discharge him from office and get the *fatwa* from the new Cheik-ul Islam. In Byzantium the Emperor, Vasileus had completed supremacy over the Greek Orthodox Patriarch<sup>3</sup>.

"Revolution from above" is the reform project of the petty bourgeois intellectuals in developing countries who try to make deep-reaching changes in society by changing the laws of the country. Its best example is probably the Kemalist regime in Turkey. This is a "short-cut" of course because in countries where internal dynamics are quasi stagnant the bourgeoisie is not developed, and therefore there is no or little demand for reforms "from

---

<sup>1</sup> For these terms and their use in a historical table see my "Kemalism, Islamism, and Globalization: A Study on the Focus of Supreme Loyalty in Globalizing Turkey," *Journal of Southeastern European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 1, no.3 (September 2001), London, Frank Cass, pp.20-50. As a matter of fact, this article written in 1999 should be consulted first for every detail concerning our subject matter here. The present article should be considered like a kind of updating of that article.

<sup>2</sup> For a very good treatise of secularism in Turkey and in France see the articles in a special number of the CEMOTIs devoted to the subject: *Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien (CEMOTI)*, Paris, no.19 (1995).

<sup>3</sup> All this was probably due to the essence of land ownership in this region: here the State controlled the religion because it also controlled the only factor of production: land. In fact, in the Middle East generally, the rule was not the private but the public (State) ownership of the land which itself was probably due to the fact that the colossal irrigation projects could be realized by public authority only. In Europe, where waterways abounded, no such role of the State was needed. There in fact private ownership of land was the rule. Therefore, civil society developed first and finally created its State, while in the Middle East the State developed first and is still trying to create its "nation" in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

below." Therefore, intellectuals use the "hand of the State" (from above) to exert the "revolution" and build a society where "nation" instead of "God" is the source of sovereignty.

Of course, there is always a bill to pay for societal shortcuts; here this bill is paid at the national elections counter.

The last term I am going to mention is Dialectics: thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. Here we'll take it simpler: Every action has its reaction, and this reaction creates its own reaction and so on.

Now, let us put these terms into use in recent Turkish experience particularly since 1997.

### **Turkey: Laicist action and its Reaction, and...**

In 1923 Turkey started a revolution from above: Kemalism. It strove to carry the country from God to Nation. *The madrasas, imam-hatib schools*, even the theology seminaries were closed and everything was rebuilt with the aim to secularize the country through the laicist policy of the State.

There was a reaction to it at the first free elections in 1950 and the victorious Demokrat [Democrat] Party re-opened religious schools (though not the *madrasas*).

Again, as a reaction to this reaction there was a laicist military coup d'Etat on May 27, 1960.

As a reaction to it at the first free elections in 1965 people overwhelmingly elected Adalet [Justice] Party under Demirel, a continuation of the Demokrat Party.

All this process can be schematized as follows:

1923 REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE (laicist action) ==> 1950 ELECTION (popular reaction) ==> 1960 COUP (laicist reaction) ==> 1965 ELECTION (popular reaction)

Naturally, there'll be a reaction to the outcome of the Demirel regime also. But very interestingly this is not a laicist reaction as one would expect from previous Turkish experience. Quite to the contrary, this reaction is "Islamist" (quote and unquote!) in outcome at least.

This is so because a very speedy industrial development under Demirel opens the way for the rise of two important social forces: The Left and the Kurds. Translated into Turkish political terminology, it reads "**The 2 Ks**": *Komünizm* (Communism) ve *Kürtçülük* (Kurdism: Kurdish nationalism). The 1980 coup of the Military is a reaction to the 2 Ks. It tries to annihilate both movements, and it purports to replace the ideological vacuum by strengthening Islam as a "social paste".

Of course, the Military is inspired by two other developments as well which are

first, External dynamics: the "Green Belt" policy of the US at the time that required mild Islamic countries to encircle and contain the Soviet Union; second, Internal dynamics: religious discourse fits well into the medium of impoverishment. As a matter of fact, the same military coup starts a sell-out privatization program etc. in order to carry the economy from import substitution to articulation with international capital, therefore prices go up and wages go down.

To sum up, the very Kemalist Turkish Military in conjunction with the Grand Bourgeoisie uses religion against the Left and the Kurds. The official ideology is defined as "Turco-Islamic Synthesis" with openly religious overtones.

In the mid 80s the result of this "Synthesis" is twofold: 1) An election victory for an Islamist party, the Refah [Wealth]. Refah Party (RP) under Necmettin Erbakan came first in the elections of 1995 with 22 percent of the votes, the strongest percentage; 2) The rise of the Islamist capital also called "Green Capital" or "Anatolian Tigers."

This process can be schematized as follows:

"ISLAMIST" MILITARY COUP OF

12 SEPTEMBER 1980

==>

LAICIST "POST-MODERN COUP" OF

FEBRUARY 28, 1997

(laicist reaction)



REFAH PARTY ELECTION VICTORY  
and THE RISE OF "GREEN CAPITAL"

(impact on popular Islam)

## **RP comes to power and starts to change**

Refah Party (RP) once coming to power it acts as if it was a spoiled child who had gained everything at once. I will mention a few sentences of its leaders: Erbakan, the party leader and prime minister, "*Working for the Refah Party is identical with working for the establishment of Koranic order*" (1991) and "*Now the question is whether Islam will come smoothly or by bloodshed.*" Erdogan then the mayor of Istanbul and prime minister now (2006) of AKP (Justice and Development Party), "[They say] *sovereignty belongs to the nation without condition* [instead of to God]. *Just watch this big lie!*" (1994). Sevki Yilmaz then mayor of Rize and later deputy for Refah Party, "*Whether you like it or not, I'm the Hizbullah* [Hizb-i Allah, literally meaning: The Party of God]. *Ninety eight per cent of Turkey is Hizbullah. Those who are not Hizbullah, are Hizb-i*



*Seytan* [literally meaning: The Party of Devil]". Sukru Karatepe, the mayor of Kayseri stated, "*We have waited, we'll wait some more. [In the mean time] The Muslims should not forget the greed, grudge and hate inside them*" (1996); Hasan Mezarci, the deputy of Refah Party stated, "*Someone from Thessaloniki [M.Kemal Ataturk] cannot be my ancestor [literally Ataturk means the ancestor of Turks] I'm not a son of a bitch.*"

And of course there is this time a laicist reaction to it. It's in a rather awkward form, an official declaration of the all-powerful National Security Council, a mix body under military influence. In fact, this declaration made on February 28, 1997 and compulsorily signed by Prime Minister Erbakan will be called a "post modern coup."

How was the Military able to do that without a coup? Because apart from the support of President Demirel, they had the support of two important elements of the society at that time:

1. The grand bourgeoisie (who had backed the "Islamist" Coup of 1980 because it was afraid of communism at that time) is no more afraid of communism because there is no communism now. On the other hand, the military coup has destroyed Turkey's image abroad. One very important businessman said, "*We cannot export T-shirts without human rights.*"
2. The civil society at that time had something very important which happened which was the Susurluk incident<sup>4</sup>. This is the first time the "Deep State" comes into open although it had always been an open secret<sup>5</sup>.

---

<sup>4</sup> On the night of November 3, 1996 a black Mercedes bumped into a truck from behind and the following people came out of it: An ultra right-wing Mafia leader searched by INTERPOL, known to be in very close contact with secret police and Deep State (dead), his girl-friend (dead), a high ranking police officer (dead), a Kurdish tribal leader deputy in the Parliament known to be in very close relationship with the State.

<sup>5</sup> "Deep State" can best be explained the following way: We define "State" as the legitimate monopoly of violence. If you delete "legitimate" from this definition, you get "Deep State". Therefore, this is an unofficial, illegitimate and loose organization formed by some very high ranking State officials (mostly military) in collaboration with other nationalist individuals and sometimes with Mafia, and using formal State authority when necessary. This Deep State always tried to legitimize its existence by the presence of and the fight against the PKK and always used the Sèvres Treaty Paranoia ("Our country will get dismembered if democracy comes"; also see Conclusion) to sustain its activities. The origins of the Deep State, although it goes for Turkey way back to the dark days of Armenian massacres of 1915, can be traced to illegal organizations that NATO set up in member countries against "Communist attack" in early 1950s. It'll be remembered that the one in Italy which was first discovered by coincidence in May 1988 was called "Gladio".

Because of this sudden discovery, the civil society in construction with who starts the massive popular demonstrations becomes particularly important, and these demonstrations target not only this dark organization but the Refah Party also.

On the other hand and apart from these reactions, both results of the "Islamist" coup of 1980 start to undergo important changes. For instance, Erbakan now only wears Versace ties and his son who doesn't have a driving license yet drives a Mercedes CL Coupe and only wears YSL socks. In short, a "bourgeoisification of the Islamists" is well under way.

The second result concerning the 1980 military coup, i.e., the rise of Green Capital: This small and medium capital's representative is MUSIAD, a counter-parallel of TUSIAD, the representative of the Grand Bourgeoisie. This association, the assets of which were evaluated as something like 40 billion US dollars, has become in the 90s the main financier of the Islamist student dormitories where you have to cover your hair and pray five times a day in order to be admitted in with a scholarship. MUSIAD is also very much against Israel as would be expected. But soon it starts to change when its members, instead of passing through the export companies of the secular Grand Bourgeoisie like before, are able to start to export their products themselves. On the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Israeli State MUSIAD'S governing board is present at the cocktail party given by the Istanbul General Consulate of Israel on May 1998. One of them said, *"Our grudge against Israel is over"*.

Of course, this important transformation does not go without some reaction from the Party members. One of them said to me personally, *"We are disappointed; we would have expected them to become Muslim capitalists, but they became capitalists."* Some of these people will set up, after the closure of RP, the Saadet [Happiness] Party against the AKP.

### **AKP comes to power and starts to change**

Reaction to the 28 of February 1997 laicist "post-modern coup" does not wait. There are elections again in 2002 and this time a second Islamist party, AKP (Justice and Development Party) comes to power with 34 % of the votes. This proportion is enough to change the Constitution.

Once in power, AKP does not act like a spoiled child as RP had done; it is very cautious especially concerning the question of the veil (female students with a veil are not admitted to universities) especially until the Strasbourg Court (European



Court of Human Rights) refused Leyla Sahin's application by ruling that the veil ban is not a human rights violation<sup>6</sup>. After this 29 of June 2004 decision, a head-on collision started between the "laicists" and the "fundamentalists" in 2005.

In the meantime, triggered by globalization, the internal dynamics of Turkey is at work. The story of this tremendous change can be told in three consecutive decades: The 80s, 90s, and 2000s<sup>7</sup>.

## The 1980s

The Islamists are able to speak up for the first time. Their central concept is Iran and also interest-free banking. At that time veil means honor, the honor of the husband of course. But this is also the first time that discord starts for the first time among Islamists for the very fact that they were able to discuss (think!) now. The main problem is: "How can we live an Islamic life?", but there is no ready or possible answer to it.

## The 1990s

There the key concept was globalization. Globalization means comparison and Islamists look in the Internet or Islamist Television broadcasting, and started to compare them to the outside world. One of the outsiders they looked into was the Europeans. This gave them self confidence because Europeans are also heavily discussing what to do and what to become.

In the 90s, interest-free banking was out and Muslim companies were in. But the important thing was that the Islamists started very "modern" things not only Islamist Television programs and Islamist newspapers but Islamist "Green Pop", hard rock, and metal rock groups as well. Islamist stand-up stars were watched with much

---

\* Like many I think this decision was/is? wrong for Europe and dangerous for Turkey; Wrong for Europe because this decision would not have been taken prior to 9/11. Dangerous for Turkey, because after this decision the State institutions, the Council of State (High Administrative Court) in particular, started to interfere with the veil of people in the streets. I will not go into details but I myself wrote, "They might also interfere with the bedrooms." It has happened once when a religion teacher was assigned to a teaching post abroad and the Council's decision forbade him to go because he had a veiled wife. This is interfering with the bedroom.

<sup>7</sup> Except for the comments relating to "Protestant-ization" of the Islamists and the "Catholic-ization" of the Kemalists, I am indebted to a paper delivered by my good friend Etyen Mahçupyan in Vienna in May 2006 (not published yet) for facts and comments from this point up to the Conclusion.

interest. One of them started a show named "*Dinliyorum*"<sup>8</sup> during which he makes fun of those who leave their mobile phone open during the prayer, etc.

"Islamist anarchists" started writing in their magazines and websites that start by an "Assalamu Aleykum" like "Queerjihad.org" became available. For instance, "Al Fatiha-net" has Popular Search buttons such as: "Gay Muslims UK, Erotic pictures, Gay Dating, Gay Photos, Muslim Porn, Adult, Free Sex, Porn, free muslim sex pics."

At the time during the end of the 90s, a veil had acquired another meaning: it came to mean "a visa to go out on the street." A visa you get from your parents to go freely on the streets maybe to meet your boyfriend in the park to hold hands with him, smoke a cigarette, and maybe kiss. A visa without you couldn't go out to live like a human being.

## The 2000s

In the 2000s the Islamist companies had gone bankrupt; Hizbullah is despised because it's a shame to Islam<sup>9</sup>. Now the key concept is EU. True, Islamists are supporting it because its values (freedom of expression, etc.) are now favorable to them, but this is not enough to explain it all. EU is simply influencing and transforming the group that it profits the most, the Islamists.

Certain concepts that had the same meaning before have now different meanings in the minds of the Islamists: religion and ethics, politics and politician, Turk and Muslim. Islamist youth starts to say, "This is not an Islamic thing, but it is not unethical either; therefore I can do it." So much change could not possibly be embraced by RP. Thus, AKP is born.

Openly, this is the "Protestantization" of the Turkish Sunnis. It will also have its projection in foreign policy; AKP is more pro-US and more pro-IMF than its laicist predecessors.

For those in Turkey who can rid themselves of the memorized sentence, "This is pure *takiyya*, nothing else!" this Protestantization should not be difficult to comprehend; just like in Europe during the 16<sup>th</sup> Century capitalism/*embourgeoisement* was creating its superstructure; it's as simple as that.

But put another way, that's not as simple as that. It's more sophisticated than many

---

<sup>8</sup> This literally means "I am listening" but if you split the word after the second syllable it means "Religious Comments".

<sup>9</sup> "Torture houses" of Hizbullah are discovered throughout Turkey where people are slaughtered like sheep.

think. To use Mahçupyan's words again, "Turkish Islamists now want a more religious but a more secular Turkey." Mahçupyan says that the Islamists in Turkey have entered into a process of catharsis, purification by self-questioning.

## Conclusion

This is a limited modernization indeed, but this is the very metamorphosis itself that can be better understood if I say that at the time when the Islamists are becoming Protestants the Kemalists are becoming Catholics.

This transformation, or if you so desire domestication, of AKP is the result of two waves that modernized/modernizes Turkey:

1. The impact of Kemalism (nationalism).
2. The impact of globalization (internationalism). There is an interesting relationship between the two that one would normally take as contradictory:

In 1920s Kemalism made a revolution from above, and there is a reaction to it from below: the Islamist reaction.

The second wave came eighty years later in the 2000s. As the lack of demand from below continues, this is a revolution from above again: EU harmonization packages dictated by the Copenhagen criteria required by Turkish candidacy to the EU.


But there is a very important change this time; these packages are supported by AKP particularly. And, who is AKP? The grandchildren of those who had given the reaction from below to the Kemalist revolution from above in the 20s!

The reason probably lies in the fact that (to an important degree) Turkish society has been secularized by the laicist policy of Kemalism during eight decades. This is a positive grade for Kemalism.

On the other hand, this ideology and movement deserves a negative grade as well for at least four reasons:

1. Because it was able to transform Turkey but stayed well behind because it was unable to transform itself, as my qualification "Catholic" has already suggested. Kemalists have been unable to start a process of catharsis until today.
2. More importantly, Kemalists are now the ones to give a reaction "from below" to the second wave of revolution from above in the 2000s. This reaction can be called "The Sèvres Paranoia" already mentioned in

footnote 5. Kemalism a very progressive movement in the 1920s has become reactionary in 2000s because it stayed the same. This process can be schematized as follows<sup>10</sup>:



3. What's more, this state of being is a self-denial for Kemalism because the very essence of this prototype of underdeveloped country nationalism lies in Atatürk's most important motto by far: "To reach the contemporary civilization." Contemporary Civilization was Europe of the 20s in Atatürk's time; it's EU in the 2000s.
4. The Kemalists who refuse to quit the 1920s and come to the 2000s should know that without the impact of globalization today Kemalist secularization (and Turkey) would have probably ended up in the vicious circle described throughout this article and schematized as follows:

LAICIST ACTION ==> DEMOCRACY ==> ISLAMIC REVIVAL ==>  
KEMALIST REACTION ==> ISLAMIST ELECTION VICTORY ==>  
KEMALIST REACTION, etc, etc.

Last but not least, Kemalists should know that their biggest victory lies in an Islamic revival modernized and domesticated by its own election victory once in power.

This is after all what Dialectics is all about.

<sup>10</sup> See my *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar; kavramlar, Lozan, iç mevzuat, içtihat, uygulama*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları?, 2004, 253 pgs. ("Minorities in Turkey, Concepts - Theory - Lausanne - Legislation - Jurisprudence).

## **The Institute's most Important Publications (1999-2004)**

### **Documentary Books**

- Political Transitions in the Arab World, Part one: Theoretical Considerations and Inter-regional Parallels, Philippe Schmitter et al.: 2001. (English)
- Political Transitions in the Arab World, Part two: Political Transitions in the Early Arab Islamic Period, Khalil Athamine and Jamal Joudeh: 2001. (Arabic)
- Political Transitions in the Arab World, Part three: Contemporary Paradigms and Cases, Henry Laurence et al. Roger Heacock ed.: 2002. (English)
- The Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles, Ibrahim Abu-Lughud et al. Ibrahim Abu-Lughud et al ed.: 1995. (English)
- The Becoming of Returnee States: Palestine, Armenia, Bosnia, Thierry Hentsch et al: 1999. (English)
- International Peacekeeping Operations: Models and Cases, Marrack Goulding, 2000. (English and Arabic)
- On Achieving Palestinian Statehood: Concepts, Ends and Means from the Perspective of International Law, Jean Allain: 2002. (English)
- Ibrahim Abu-Lughod: Resistance, Exile and Return. Conversations with Hisham Ahmed- Fararjeh: 2003. (English)

### **Conferences**

- Cultural Confrontations across the Mediterranean: Palestine and Europe, Alain Joxe et al. Lili Faydi and Roger Heacock ed.: 1996. (English and Arabic)
- The Landscape of Palestine: Equivocal Poetry, Edward Said et al. Ibrahim Abu- Lughod et al. ed.: 1999. (English)
- The New Palestine the New Europe: Selected papers from The February 2001 International Academic Conference, Khalil Nakhleh et al: 2003. (English)
- The Impact of the Israeli Elections on the Local, Regional, and International Levels: A Preliminary Analysis, selected articles presented at the local conference in January 2003. (English and Arabic)
- Implications of the US War in Iraq Globally, Regionally and Locally: selected papers presented at the 8<sup>th</sup> international conference, 2003. (English, Arabic and French)
- Between the Archival Forest and the Anecdotal Trees: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Palestinian Social History: selected papers presented at the 9<sup>th</sup> international conference, 2004. (English and Arabic)

### **Strategic Papers**

- Overcoming the Crisis: Towards a New Palestinian Strategy, Ali Jarbawi: 2001. (Arabic)
- US Policy and the Question of Palestine, Fuad al-Moughrabi: 2002. (Arabic)
- The Emergence and Evolution of the Palestinian Elite, Hassan Khader: 2003. (Arabic)
- From Jihad to Peaceful Co-existence: the Development of Islamic Views on Politics and International Relations, Raja Bahlul: 2003. (English and Arabic)
- Political Culture in Palestine, Mahmoud Me'ari: 2003. (Arabic)
- The Saudi Territorial Entitlement to the Southern Part of the Palestinian Negev, Muhsen Yusef: 2003. (Arabic)
- The Myth of Camp David, Helga Baumgarten: 2003. (English)
- Prospects for and Obstacles to Achieving a Viable Palestinian State, Martin Beck: 2004. (English)
- The Islamic Left Wing-Overview, Naser Hamed Abu- Zaid: 2004. (Arabic)
- Inter Arab Relations Under American Hegemony, Hasan Naf'a: 2004. (Arabic)
- The United Nations, the Dilemma of Multi - Lateral Diplomay, Johny Assy: 2005. (Arabic)
- Beyond the Armed Struggle, Jean Allain: 2005. (English)
- Obstacles to a European Role in the Arab - Israeli Conflict Resolution, Gassan El Ezzi: 2005. (Arabic)
- Reform: Roots, Meanings and Usage (Palestine as a Case Study), Basem Zbeidi: 2005. (Arabic)

### **MA Theses**

- Nationality and Palestinian Citizenship, Mu'tazz Qafishe: 2000. (Arabic)
- Palestinian Prisoners after Oslo 1993-1999, Issa Qaraqe: 2001 (Arabic)

### **A Series of Strategic Papers about Palestinian Institutional Reform**

- Ways for Developing and Empowering the Young Staff in the PNA Institutions, Samir Salameh and Frouq Eddik: 2003. (Arabic)
- The Role and Status of the Female Staff in the PNA Institutions: Problems and Solutions, Marline Rabadi: 2003.(Arabic)
- The Role of Fatah Movement (the ruling party) and the PNA Fatah-affiliated



Staff in Reinforcing the Reform Process. Osama El Bast and Naef Sweitat: 2004. (Arabic, English Summary)

- Reinforcing the perspectives and possibilities for coordination between the PNA institutions themselves and the PNA institutions and NGO's, Problems and Recommendation. Izat Abdel Hadi and Saleh Masharqa. 2004. (Arabic, English Summary)
- Problems encountering municipalities, possibilities of strengthening their connections with the public as well as fortifying its local authority through its relation with the Ministry of Local Governments. Walid Wahdan and Muneef Treish. 2004. (Arabic, English Summary)
- "Dilemmas of the Palestinian diplomatic missions, ideas and suggestions to enhance the qualifications and professionalism of diplomats and the young staff working in the diplomatic field". 2004. (Arabic, English Summary)
- "The status of the young deputies, and their role in reforming the relations between the legislative and the executive powers". 2004. (Arabic, English Summary)
- "Coordination problems between different security institutions, relation of security institutions with the public, the role of the young middle ranking staff in reforming these institutions". 2004. (Arabic, English Summary)