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Kemalism, Islamism and Globalization: A Study on the Focus of Supreme Loyalty in Globalizing Turkey

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This article deals with the loyalty question in modern Turkey, studying, from this point of view, the relations between nationalism, Islamism and globalization since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. 'Loyalty in the post-national state' is a fairly new subject of discussion. Therefore, this article will first of all take a brief glance at some processes and general concepts and will also put forward some hypotheses.

INTRODUCTION: PROCESSES, CONCEPTS AND HYPOTHESES

Loyalty, or more precisely the Focus of Supreme Loyalty (FSL), represents the highest concept around which the individuals in a given society agree to gather to build a cohesive entity. To locate fully the meaning of FSL, one should first circumscribe the process through which it is formulated and also define the concepts taking place in this process, and secondly describe the qualifications of FSL.

The Process and its Concepts

The starting point of the process is the concept of mode of production (MP), the basis of a given social-economic order. Every MP is realized within the boundary of a 'marketplace'. This territory, the size of which broadens every time a new (and more developed) MP replaces the old one, is what people each time call 'motherland', simply because the whole process of social and economic activity (in short, the very life itself) takes place within its boundaries. Every new MP formulates its own cohesion ideology (CI). CI is the main ideology formulated by the dominant group/ruling class¹ to keep the society firmly together under the set of values and interests of this group/class.² Every CI, in turn, points up to a new FSL to reshape the society. The process can thus be formulated as follows:

New Mode of Production → New Cohesion Ideology → New
Focus of Supreme Loyalty.

Here it is important to keep in mind that every FSL is embodied in an institution, which itself is represented by the elite of the said group/class. To concretize this process, let us take up European history (an integral part of which is the Ottoman Empire and *a fortiori*, the Republic of Turkey) from the Middle Ages to the present day (see Table 1 below).

TABLE 1
COHESION IDEOLOGY AND ITS FOCUS OF SUPREME LOYALTY
SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES

Represented by	Church (clergy/ aristocracy)	Parliament (bourgeoisie)	Communist Party (<i>nomenklatura</i>)	?
Focus of Supreme Loyalty (FSL)	God	Nation	<i>Labour</i>	?
Cohesion Ideology	Religion	Nationalism	<i>Proletarian internationalism</i>	?
Marketplace (‘motherland’)	Manor	Independent national state	<i>Proletarian state</i>	The Globe
Mode of Production	Feudalism	(National) capitalism	<i>Communism</i>	International capitalism (globalization)
Phase	1 ¹ →	2 →	2a →	3

Feudal order sprung from the ashes of the Dark Ages, during which the only institution that escaped the destruction of the Vandal attacks, thanks mainly to its fortress-like monasteries, was the church. The church was the only sanctuary of the desperate masses, and accumulated immense wealth mainly through their donations and bequests. Its clergy, on the other hand, was the only possessor of the unique ‘hi-tech’ knowledge of the period, reading and writing in Latin. The church therefore became the strongest of the feudal lords, and it was only normal that its CI became the CI of the period: religion.⁴ During feudalism, religion pointed up to God as the FSL. God was of course represented by the church, in other words, the clergy (phase 1).

As the MP evolved from feudalism to mercantilism,⁵ the marketplace became much larger because trade, transcending the lands of the manor,

came to encompass the whole territory of the absolute monarchy and even further (actually, that was the reason why the bourgeoisie helped the king to set up this form of monarchy).

This radical change in the concept of *territory*, as it always happens in history, had very deep effects on the minds of people. The expansion of trade to the outer corners of the kingdom unavoidably took along the common language first, then common feelings, and so on. Instead of the manor, people slowly started to call the whole kingdom 'motherland'. In this nation-building process, where the rational atmosphere of the Enlightenment prevailed, FSL seemed for a moment located in the prince (Leviathan, the benevolent monarch of Hobbes, no longer received his mandate from God).

But as the process continued from mercantilism to capitalism proper, a chain of philosophers with Rousseau as the final and crucial link came to propose the concept of nation as the FSL. With the revolutionary fever of 1789 helping, nationalism as the CI was finally born.⁶ When the king was decapitated, the nation as FSL was represented by the national parliament, or more realistically by the national bourgeoisie, to whom the monopoly of trade within the realm of the nation-state now belonged (phase 2).

After 1917, this order of things was challenged by a new MP, communism, that pointed up to labour as the FSL (phase 2a – only some countries have experienced it).

At the turn of the new century, we are witnessing the advent of a new MP, international capitalism, rarely expressed as such but generally called globalization (phase 3).⁷ This phase 3 is the antithesis of both phases 2 and 2a. Communism, at least for today, exists no more as a world system. National capitalism is also over (or will soon be over) with all its attributes: import substitution in the economy, monopoly over jurisdiction in the national territory, nationalism in cultural life, and most important of all, the concept of the nation as FSL. All this happens because the concept of territory is changing (getting enlarged) again: the same 'national' boundaries that once created the bourgeoisie are now strangling it.

In this phase, all we are sure of is the new MP (international capitalism) and its new marketplace (the globe). The new CI is not there yet, and cannot be expected to appear so soon in this 'new world disorder'. The FSL seems to be turning towards the individual but the question as to who will represent the individual remains unanswerable yet.

Characteristics of the FSL: Some Hypotheses

1. One question has to be settled first: why 'supreme'?

Every individual has more focuses of loyalty than only one. One feels loyalty to one's family, hometown, work, ethnic group, and so on. Above all, one feels 'loyalty' to oneself because personal interest, directly related to self-preservation, is the most fundamental of all instincts.

The FSL should not be confused, however, with the outcome of such instincts. It should not be forgotten that it is a concept introduced by the CI, itself a dependent variable of the MP. In this sense, various loyalties felt by an individual can be compared to one's sub-identities, and the FSL to one's upper-identity. Sub-identities can be several (in fact, an individual is considered 'developed' only if he/she has many sub-identities), but the upper-identity is unique and it is different from the sum of the sub-identities or from any single one of them.⁸

2. The FSL is then, by definition, unique; it cannot be more than one at a given moment.⁹

Maybe the easiest way to explain this is to refer to the following question, probably the best criterion to identify the FSL in a given society:¹⁰ 'what is the source of the mandate for power?'

The answer to this question can be, for instance, 'God' or 'Nation', but never both at the same time, because they are mutually exclusive.¹¹ The FSL cannot be several at a time, but it can of course change as a result of a change of the MP. When a society feels deep inside a conflict of FSL, it is in transition – and definitely in crisis. This crisis will end when the new CI will be able to get the society to embrace the new FSL. Even by then, some segments of the society, more probably some social classes disfavoured by the new MP, will continue to be in crisis.¹²

3. In case of such a crisis, the direction of the societal evolution (the direction of the change in the FSL) is necessarily forward, that is, from left to right in terms of Table 1.

The reason for this is simple. The FSL is function of the MP, and the MP created in this case by internal dynamics¹³ is by definition a more developed one, and is therefore non-reversible. A society that once experienced a more developed form of MP (capitalism) will not go back to and settle for an inferior form (feudalism); a society that enjoyed democracy will not go back to and settle for dictatorship,

and so on. Going back from a superior stage to an inferior one should be considered only exceptional, such as in the case of a total great disaster.¹⁴

4. Paragraph 3 above portrays the situation in western European countries, where the new FSL is a function of a new MP changed by internal dynamics.

But, the crucial question of this paper is as follows: *what happens when a society, where the FSL has been changed by external dynamics only,¹⁵ faces the influence of a superior phase?*

In other words, translated into the terms of Table 1, what will happen if a country that makes a transition from phase 1 to phase 2 through a 'revolution from above' (that is, without becoming a real nation-state), is 'struck' by the dynamics of phase 3 (and is forced to go beyond the nation-state)?

This question is important both practically and theoretically. Practically, because there are a multitude of similar countries outside of the Western world. Theoretically, because in such a situation the non-reversibility of the FSL process described above seems to be seriously challenged, as the said countries show signs of a 'backwards transition' to religion, especially to Islam (in terms of Table 1, a society in phase 2, facing the influence of phase 3, wishes to return to phase 1).

The main hypothesis of this article is that such a development is impossible for two reasons. First, as mentioned in paragraph 3 above, the MP development process is non-reversible. Second, the economically ruling class (which formulates the CI and its FSL) will articulate, under Western influence, the superior phase and will see to it that the society finally makes a 'forward' transition¹⁶ in choosing its new FSL.

The following sections will study the Turkish experience and try to prove this hypothesis.

TURKEY: FROM GOD TO NATION UNDER KEMALISM

Republican Turkey, the direct successor of the semi-theocratic¹⁷ Ottoman Empire and still the only laicist country in the Muslim world,¹⁸ made the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 under the 'revolution from above' of Mustafa Kemal, to whom the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) gave the family name of Atatürk ('ancestor of Turks') in 1934.

The Turkish war of independence started in 1919 and ended in August 1922 with the defeat (the 'Mikrasiatiki Katastrofi') of the

invading Greek armies backed by the Great Powers. In fact, the nationalists under Kemal had also fought the war on a second – and, more difficult – front: against the armies of the sultan-caliph as well as against the insurgencies provoked by Istanbul.¹⁹

The transition from 'God' to 'Turkish Nation' was started even before the war was over.²⁰ This process was an integral part of the first prototype of an 'underdeveloped country nationalism',²¹ during which the Westernized elite (mostly the military) strove to build, in a basically feudal society, a 'nation' by simulating the atmosphere of the seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment.

This transition concerning the FSL was accomplished by a 'revolution from above' that aimed, first, to destroy the foundations of the *umma* (religious community) order, and second, to erect the new foundations of a nation-state. This process can be summarized in the following chronology:

23 April 1920. Opening of the GNA.

20 January 1921. Art.1 of the first Constitution declared: 'sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation. The system of administration is based on the people administering their own destiny'.²²

1 November 1922. Abolition of the sultanate by 'decision' of the GNA.²³

29 October 1923. Declaration of the Republic.²⁴

3 March 1924. (a) Abolition of the caliphate (b) Abolition of the Ministry of Shariah and of Religious Foundations and its replacement by the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA) (c) Attachment of all schools to the Ministry of National Education. Religious schools (*medresseh*) were closed.²⁵

8 April 1924. Abolition of religious courts.²⁶

30 November 1925. Closure of *tekkes* (dervish lodges).²⁷

17 February 1926. Adoption of Swiss Civil Code.

1 July 1926. Adoption of Italian Penal Code.²⁸

1 November 1928. Abolition of the Arabic alphabet and adoption of the Latin alphabet.²⁹

10 April 1928. Provision of the 1924 (second) Constitution that declared, 'the religion of Turkey is Islam', was deleted.

23 April 1930. Foundation of the Committee for the Study of Turkish History (renamed in 1935 the Turkish Historical Society).

10 May 1931. Laicism was included in the programme of the Republican People's Party as one of the 'Six Arrows' (principles).³⁰

12 July 1932. Foundation of the Society for the Study of Turkish Language (renamed in 1936 the Turkish Linguistic Society).³¹

February 1933. *Ezan* (call to prayer) started to be sung in Turkish instead of in Arabic.

5 February 1937. Laicism entered in the constitution (art.2) along with the other 'arrows'.

Religious Education

The republic was particularly anti-clerical in the field of religious education. The number of students at the Theology Seminar fell from 284 in 1925 to 167 in 1926 and 20 in 1933. The seminar (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*) was closed in 1941 because 'there were no more students'. There were 29 *Imam-Hatip* (prayer leader) schools in 1924. This number was reduced to 2 in 1930, and in the same year these schools were closed.³² Religious courses were excluded from the curricula in the 1930s in city schools and in 1939 in village schools.³³

TURKEY IN THE POST-KEMALIST PERIOD: REACTION

These reforms of superstructure, which also transformed the basically feudal infrastructure of Turkish society in a substantial way, caused a popular reaction in religious form.³⁴ This reaction found its effective expression after CHP, Atatürk's party, had to step down at the first free elections in 1950. 'Small-town politicians' discovered that yielding to and even provoking the religious demands of the masses was most rewarding. This process can be briefly summarized as follows:

Already in 1948, the Theology Seminar had reopened in Ankara, and *Imam-Hatip* 'courses' restarted in ten cities.

One of the first decisions of the new government in 1950 was to reinstate the *ezan* in Arabic.

The *Imam-Hatip* 'courses' being found 'inadequate', seven-year *Imam-Hatip* schools were reopened in 1951, with three years of secondary (grade) school and four years of grammar (high) school. The number of these schools was to reach 20 in 1960, 70 in 1970. In 1960, girls were admitted for the first time, although in Islam women cannot be prayer leaders.

For the first time in 1973, these schools were excluded from the category 'vocational high schools', and their graduates were therefore permitted to enter all branches of the universities. This was to prove to be the most important of all anti-revolutionary reactions because it was the beginning of the recreation of the religious 'counter-elite'.

TURKEY AFTER 1980: FROM NATION TO GOD?

This trend found a very fertile soil after the military coup of 12 September 1980. Although the military in Turkey are traditionally staunch Kemalists, this time the junta strongly backed up religious circles for two main reasons. First, because of external dynamics. The US had by that time adopted a new strategy to stop communism, the 'Green Belt', and the generals had no friends other than the US because of the worsening human rights situation in Turkey. Second, and more importantly, because of internal dynamics. The generals found it very convenient to mobilize religion to fight against the '2 K's': the very active leftist movement on the one side (*Komünizm*), and Kurdish separatist nationalism (also leftist) on the other.³⁵ This process can be summarized as follows:

Art.24 of the generals' 1982 constitution made religious lessons compulsory throughout high school for the first time.³⁶

Art.134 of the same constitution transformed the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Linguistic Society³⁷ into official agencies to propagate the new official ideology, the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', definitely more Islamic than Turkish (racist nationalist) in character.

General Evren, the head of the junta who eventually become president, always recited several verses of the Koran in his public speeches (he adored to preach wherever and whenever he could) to back up whatever he had to say that particular day, including defending laicism. This was unheard of until that period.

Pamphlets containing verses of the Koran or the words of the Prophet (*hadis*) recommending obedience to public authority were dropped from military planes in Kurdish-populated areas; they were also constantly broadcast from radio and TV channels. Hizb-Allah, a religious fundamentalist Kurdish secret organization was supported to fight against the PKK, the (then) Marxist Kurdish separatist organization. Small mosques were opened in practically every state institution, including the GNA.

Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA)

By 1990, the budget of the DRA had grown to unprecedented dimensions. It surpassed that of many full-fledged ministries: one and a half times larger than that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, twice that of the Ministry of the Interior, three and a half times that of the Ministry

of Industry and Trade, six times that of the Ministry of Tourism, and seven times that of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The 1994 budget of the DRA surpassed that of five ministries put together (Forestry, Labour and Social Security, Finance, Energy and Natural Resources, and Tourism). It was also larger than that of 13 important government agencies put together (such as the GNA, the Presidency of the Republic, the Constitutional Court and all the higher courts, the State Planning Organization, and others).³⁸ The budget of the DRA has kept the same trend into the new century. In the 2000 budget, it was ten times that of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 3.4 times that of the Ministry of Forestry, one and a half times that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 1.2 times that of the Ministry of Interior.³⁹ The DRA's personnel grew from 53,582 in 1983 to 84,717 in 1988 (an increase of 58 per cent), reaching over 90,000 in 1994.

In 1999, there were 70,213 mosques attached to the DRA. 1,500 new mosques were built every year, (that is, one every six hours).⁴⁰ The number of (official) Koran courses increased tenfold in the years 1983–93 to reach 5,000 in 1990, with 175,000 students. (In the same period, the total number of hospitals was 857 and the total number of all schools was 66,000. One school was built every six days).⁴¹ By 1990, the DRA started to publish *fetwa* books on issues ranging from eating and sexual habits to banking and interest on money.⁴²

The DRA also set up a very wealthy foundation (*Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı*) owning seven holdings, with businesses ranging from tourism to education and from film-making to the food industry.⁴³ By the year 1999, the foundation had 912 branches and owned 7,300 pieces of real-estate all over Turkey.⁴⁴

At a given moment mosque construction was very much exaggerated and the DRA publicly declared that too many mosques were already built and that people should help build schools and hospitals instead.⁴⁵ In October 1997, it also announced that, in order to stop the cacophony, the *ezan* should be performed from the loudspeakers of only one major mosque in each city, and that in the smaller mosques the *ezan* should be done by climbing the minaret, without using the loudspeakers. The prayer leaders to this day (November 2001) have ignored this DRA instruction. The same has also been true for a May 1998 decision concerning the obligation to obtain the written permission of the DRA for mosque construction.

For the year 2010, the DRA declared it planned to increase the number of mosques to 103,000, and the number of its personnel to 238,000.⁴⁶

Religious Education

Twenty-three new theology seminars were opened in the universities during the period 1980–92. The number of *Imam-Hatip* high schools rose to 581 in 1996. Most of their 500,000 students started taking government jobs (especially in the police force and the Ministry of Interior) instead of becoming prayer leaders.⁴⁷ Religious sects and orders have opened student dormitories all over the country, especially in the big cities, with the obligation for girls to cover their heads and for all students to pray five times a day and strictly follow the sect's rules.

Economic Situation

As a reflection of nationalist economic policy (statism), Turkish official strategy in the economic field since the 1930s had been one of import substitution to protect the national bourgeoisie against outside competition. This policy was radically and drastically reversed after 1980, as Turgut Özal, the junta's economic policy-maker and a disciple of the *Nakshibendi* order (he was to become prime minister in 1983 at the first elections after the 1980 coup, and president of the republic in 1989; he died in 1993). This champion of privatization chose to 'open Turkey to the outside world' by suddenly and radically liberalizing the economy and finance through credits and under the close supervision of the IMF and the World Bank.

Turkey soon became an integral part of global economics. Foreign capital began to flow in, especially in credits and through foreign direct investments. Özal brought the value of the national currency (Turkish Lira) to a realistic level, the Turkish economy became more competitive, and its financial credibility as well as its reserves of foreign currency rose with its booming exports. Large Turkish holding companies proved to be particularly aggressive in obtaining large construction contracts abroad and began to make huge profits, first with the help of the Iran–Iraq war and later with the birth of new states in the Balkans and Central Asia. On the other hand, the state began a sell-out privatization programme.⁴⁸

Interest rates rocketed under Özal's monetary policies, however, and banker scandals savagely destroyed small savings overnight and shook the country socially as well as economically. Unemployment rose to levels unheard of before. At the same time, inflation began to rise inversely proportional to the ever-dropping value of the Turkish Lira (TL).⁴⁹ As income distribution worsened daily,⁵⁰ a drastic impoverishment of the fixed-income strata soon began to go hand in hand with an unbelievable corruption, in administration in particular⁵¹ and morals in general.

In this picture, another aspect of Özalist economics and politics deserves special attention: the rise of what came to be called 'Islamist capital'.

The Rise of 'Islamist Capital'

This capital was not a new thing altogether. It was first heard of after 1969, when Professor Necmettin Erbakan, also a staunch *Nakshibendi*, made his entry into politics as the President of the Union of Chambers, traditionally the stronghold of small and medium business in Anatolia. Professor Erbakan became the champion of the latter by advocating a nationalistic 'Heavy Industrial Leap Forward' against the internationalist discourse of Istanbul big business which advocated international economic order and entry to the European Community.

Under Özal, the 'Islamist capital' and its political organizations flourished. First, banks from Iran and especially Saudi Arabia were permitted to operate in Turkey, endowed with some special privileges that Turkish banks did not enjoy. They were soon to be accused of 'whitewashing black money' and of financing Islamist organizations. Second, businessmen from small and medium Anatolian towns⁵² began to rise and subsequently enter the realm of foreign trade, until then *chasse gardée* of the large holding companies of Istanbul.⁵³ These 'Anatolian Tigers', as they came to be called, not only asserted an important pressure on national politics through their organization, MÜSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen – see also footnote 67), but also began to finance Islamist organizations, and comfortable student dormitories in particular, on condition that students staying there lived a true Islamic life. MÜSIAD also became the principal supporter of Professor Erbakan's religious fundamentalist party,⁵⁴ the *Refah*.

A very high rate of internal migration (three per cent on average, four per cent for a big city like Istanbul, up to 13 per cent for some cities in the southeast)⁵⁵ also helped to make this period a perfect 'laboratory medium' for religious fundamentalism to flourish. The Pavlovian reflex of the masses mentioned above (footnote 34) had worked again, and the impoverished masses, also violently reacting to what they perceived as Westernization (in particular, erotic material on TV channels), began to consider Islam as the only way for salvation, in the 'other' world if not in this one. It was this atmosphere that finally made Professor Erbakan the leader of a coalition government in June 1996.

Here, it is appropriate to note that the atmosphere that made *Refah*'s success possible also strongly affected two very opposite sides in adopting Islamist jargon and ideology: the two centre-right parties,

Motherland (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP) and True Path (*Dogru Yol Partisi*, DYP); and the Kurdish nationalist organization PKK. In particular, the latter's sharp transition to Islamist discourse was amazing, for it had always declared itself Marxist-Leninist until the late 1980s.

Refah's main slogan, 'Just Order' (*Adil Düzen*), proved to be very successful in the ongoing economic, social and political chaos. Erbakan defined it in his green book, *Just Economic Order*, as religious, and especially Islamic, civilization, and impoverished masses quickly interpreted it as a regime that would bring them both the economic ease and the peace of mind of the 'Golden Past' that never was. *Refah* came first in the general elections of December 1995; it obtained 21.38 per cent of the votes and, thanks to the unimaginable political and economical ambitions of Tansu Çiller,⁵⁶ became the senior member of the coalition government until July 1997. The mayors of the two largest cities were also its members, and the third largest city's mayor was known to be a very strong sympathizer.

Once in power, *Refah* could not possibly improve such an economic mess; it could only simulate the Islamic order to keep its voters happy. Therefore the party, also spoiled by its electoral success, started to act as if it had won the majority vote in a Turkey where Kemalism was unknown. Bearded and turbaned sheiks of the religious sects and orders⁵⁷ were invited to break the fast of Ramadan at a banquet given in their honour at Prime Minister Erbakan's official residence, thereby giving them a symbolic official recognition.

On multiple occasions, *Refah's* various leaders made declarations such as: 'Working for the Party is identical with working for the establishment of Koranic order'; 'Saying that the origin of the mandate of power is the Nation [instead of God] is a big lie; democracy is not an aim in itself, but a means' (R.T. Erdogan, mayor of Istanbul); 'Turkey should send jet bombers to save her Muslim brothers in Bosnia'; 'Muslims should keep up their greed, grudge and hate while waiting for Islam to come'; 'Turkey is doomed like Algeria'; 'The question now is whether Islam will come smoothly or by bloodshed' (Erbakan).

Violent street manifestations of the rank-and-file were fully supported by the words and deeds of these leaders. When a young party member beat up a woman journalist in front of TV cameras, he was quickly taken away from the scene and later given a better job in another *Refah* municipality. When a mayor from *Refah* was arrested for stating at a 'Jerusalem Night' that Islam would be 'injected into [the veins of] the Westernized elite' and for hanging up there big posters of Islamic terrorist leaders, *Refah's* minister of justice paid him a visit in prison.

In the meantime, the mayors of the three big cities started, on one side, to prohibit the sale and use of alcoholic drinks, and on the other to give municipal contracts to companies reputed for being staunch political and financial supporters of *Refah*.

The list of human and financial resources controlled by the Islamists were impressive: 854 private schools, around 900 public schools, almost 5,000 private courses, 124 radio channels, 41 TV channels, 5,200 local newspapers and magazines, an unknown number of publishing houses, 11 finance corporations controlling 1.3 billion dollars, 7 large holding companies, over 7,000 large corporations, over 2,000 student dormitories, 4,000 associations, 4,500 foundations, an unknown number of civil servants, 40 provincial governors [*vali*], 89 assistant provincial governors, around 300 district governors [*kaymakam*], a substantial number of parliamentarians.⁵⁸

* * *

Many people in and out of Turkey interpreted all these developments since 1980 as Turkey going back to Islam. In terms of Table 1, this assumption can be put as follows. Turkey made the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 through a Kemalist revolution from above without becoming a real nation-state. Now that she has been 'struck' by the dynamics of phase 3, forcing her to go beyond the nation-state, Turkish society tries to find 'salvation' in making a 'backwards transition' to phase 1 and espousing the same CI (Islam) as she had some 70 years ago. The following section of this article will try to assess whether this interpretation of 'backwards transition' is accurate for Turkey.

TURKEY AFTER FEBRUARY 1997: QUO VADIS?

Political Developments

At the beginning of 1997, Kemalism began a counter-attack, the keynote of which was given by the military. The National Security Council,⁵⁹ in its 28 February 1997 Declaration, criticized very severely the anti-laicist atmosphere and asked the (*Refah*) government to take appropriate measures to stop the proliferation of Islamist cadres and to apply the Kemalist laws (outlined above). After this document (which Erbakan had to sign as prime minister) was issued, the military gave a series of briefings to the press in which religious fundamentalism was declared the most dangerous enemy.⁶⁰

In this funny situation, something even funnier happened: the coalition fell unexpectedly at the end of June 1997, simply because Çiller had now wanted to become prime minister, as stipulated in the coalition protocol, and Erbakan had resigned to switch places with her. But things had not turned out as the two had planned. This was an occasion for Mesut Yılmaz of the conservative ANAP to found a new coalition with two other parties, Ecevit's social democratic *Demokratik Sol Parti* (Democratic Left Party, DSP) and Cindoruk's conservative *Demokrat Türkiye Partisi* (Democratic Turkey Party, DTP), with outside support from Baykal's *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (People's Republican Party, CHP), the old party of Atatürk.

The new government, enjoying strong backing from the Kemalists and especially from the military, started a series of anti-fundamentalist measures. It began actively to investigate the Islamists; inspect student dormitories owned and run by the Islamist sects; transfer elsewhere those Islamists holding key government posts, such as at the Ministry of National Education; question the Islamist tendencies of some provincial and district governors; and finally try to get under control religious foundations, the number of which had reached 800 by 1997. Most important of all, however, was the closure of the first 3 years of *Imam-Hatip* schools through the extension from five to eight years of compulsory and free primary education,⁶¹ as requested in the National Security Council's 28 February Declaration.

In the meantime, in May 1997, the Prosecutor General of the Republic had filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional (Supreme) Court for the closure of *Refah*, citing 'unconstitutional actions against laicism' by the party. It was the first time in Turkey (and perhaps in the world) that this had been attempted against a political party still in power. *Refah* was closed by the Constitutional Court in January 1998 for its anti-laicist and unconstitutional Islamic discourse and actions.

* * *

Once more, the Turkish military was the undisputed dominant factor in politics. It would be very misleading, however, to see these developments simply as the result of prodding of the military. First, it was widely accepted that the military 'had had to put the Parliament to work', because a great majority of the parliamentarians were most reluctant to take any action against the Islamists. This was because either they were afraid of losing votes, or, more probably, they had been involved themselves in some kind of corruption one way or the other and were afraid of being deprived of their legislative immunities by *Refah*'s votes

in parliament. There was a large consensus in public opinion about the military having to fill in the vacuum created by parliament. Second, the reaction created by Islamists had caused a true renaissance of Kemalist activity practically dormant until around 1995. The great majority of educated people in the large cities started to wear Atatürk badges, stick Kemalist slogans to their cars, organize large public demonstrations and work in Kemalist associations.

Kemalists were not the only group that showed a strong reaction to Islamist practices. TÜSIAD (*Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği*, Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen; the association of Istanbul big business) had published a very important report in January 1997, one month before the military, entitled *Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri* (Democratization Perspectives in Turkey). The report asked for radical liberal reforms, and particularly underlined that the first three years of *İmam-Hatip* schools should be closed (see below).

Why did the military, who had declared communism the nation's number one enemy in February 1973 and openly promoted Islam after the coup of 1980, now turn its arrows against the Islamists? The reason was that, by 1997, there was no communist threat from 'Russia' (this was most important for the military), no leftist movement to speak of, and no anarchy in the streets. On the other hand, there now was a seemingly very strong Islamist movement that openly challenged the *sine qua non* concepts of the Turkish military. First, the Islamists were challenging both the cherished concept for which the military had always considered itself responsible, the *Turkish Nation*, and also the concept constituting the most important legacy of Atatürk, *Westernization*. This constituted a double threat for the military: Because the FSL is always unique, it was either the military's FSL or the Islamists' FSL. On the other hand, the Turkish military's position as the foremost defender of these two concepts had always been the very basis of their superiority in Turkish politics, something they would have lost if the Islamists had won. Secondly, the Islamists were challenging the most important concept of all military forces in the world: discipline. When one of the officers accused of religious fundamentalism and eventually discharged from the armed forces declared, 'I'll obey my own *İmam* [religious leader] and not my commander!', it was too much for the military, who were already feeling very uneasy because of the fact that the main strength of the Islamists came from the support given to them by the 1980 junta.

The Rivals of Kemalism Today

In contemporary Turkey, three rivals seem to challenge Kemalism and its FSL (Turkish Nation): nationalist Kurds, Islamists and Globalization.

1) *Nationalist Kurds*. Nationalist Kurds, mainly represented by the PKK until 1999, challenged not only Kemalism but also the 'indivisibility of Turkey' founded by Kemal. If taken strictly from the point of view of our subject matter here, this rival is the least important for a number of reasons. First, PKK's FSL is the 'Kurdish Nation in an Independent Kurdistan', while Kemalism's FSL is the 'Turkish Nation in an Independent Turkey'. Both feel loyalty to the nation and to the independent nation-state. Thus, their FSLs are conceptually the same. From this angle, the contesting Kurds are, in a way, staunch Kurdish 'Kemalists'. Second, not all of the Kurds contesting Kemalism are challenging the indivisibility of Turkey, because not all of them want independence. Even the PKK itself is very ambiguous in this matter. Third, not all of the Turkish nationals of Kurdish descent (approximately 20 per cent of the population of Turkey) are Kurdish nationalists. Some of them are assimilated, as witnessed by the fact that Ziya Gökalp, the 'father' of Turkish nationalism in the 1920s, as well as three of the nine presidents of the republic, were of Kurdish origin. Many Kurds prefer to stay as Turkish nationals of 'respected Kurdish descent', rather than become nationals of a probably landlocked, tribal and autocratic Kurdistan. Finally, globalization is the main concept responsible for the highlighted position of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey today (the relation between communications and nationalism is only too well known). But, on the other hand, the two-edged nature of this concept is also fully present here: In an age of globalization, where the materialistic values of the West flood every corner of the globe, many Kurds, if provided with a decent job and respect for their sub-identity, would very probably be assimilated. While Turkish parents try to send their kids to English-medium schools, Kurdish parents would hardly send theirs to Kurdish-medium schools.⁶²

On the other hand, the PKK's Kurdish nationalism is provoking Turkish nationalism. At the beginning of the 1990s, when the PKK was hitting hard, people began to paste Turkish flag stickers on their cars, sing the national anthem at the opening of regular football games (the custom was to sing it at international games only), make wild demonstrations while saying good-bye to enlisted youngsters, and so on. But it should be added that this kind of ultra-nationalism usually takes place not among the Kemalists but among the unconscious masses

further provoked by the pro-fascists who profess the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and call themselves 'nationalists' (*Milliyetçi*).

2) *Islamists*. From the point of view of our subject matter here, the Islamic challenge is much more important practically and, to an even greater degree, theoretically. Practically, because the highest vote in the December 1995 elections (approximately 22 per cent) was scored by an Islamist party, and also because the Kemalist state is very much influenced by Islamist cadres placed in important administrative levels. What is more, these cadres are continuously fed every year both by thousands of *Imam-Hatip* graduates and by immense money flowing in from religious foundations financed by the 'Anatolian capital' mentioned above, and very possibly by Saudi and Iranian banks as well. Theoretically, because Islam's FSL is the very opposite to that of Kemalism, and also because, in a country like Turkey (according to statistics Turkey is 98 per cent Muslim, mostly Sunnis), it has the potential to impose severe restrictions on the freedom of choice of non-Muslims and non-believers on the one side, and of non-Sunni Muslims (*Alevi*s), on the other.

The Islamists are those who, when asked their primary identity, answer 'I'm a Muslim', in sharp contradistinction with saying 'I'm a Turk'. Their cars' rear window stickers read (in heavy Ottoman Turkish), '*Hakimiyet Allahindir*' (Sovereignty Belongs to Allah), against those of the Kemalists' (in 'pure Turkish' developed in the 1930s by the above-mentioned Turkish Linguistic Society), '*Egemenlik Ulusundur*' (Sovereignty Belongs to the Nation').⁶³

This Islamist challenge can be studied in two distinct groups: Those who vote for Islamic parties like *Refah* or *Fazilet*, and those who lead and finance Islamic parties.

a) The voters of the Islamist parties. Aside from a small core of Islamic sect (*tarikât*) members, this first category is mainly composed of sympathizers who had traditionally voted for centre-right conservative parties. This fact is demonstrated by the fact that in the last elections (18 April 1999), *Fazilet* came only third and lost many votes to MHP, an ultra-nationalist party using Islamic jargon.

Even if one only considers the 22 per cent vote realized by *Refah* in the December 1995 elections, one must admit that this was the peak of Islamist votes in Turkey. It is very difficult to affirm that there exists an 'Islamist tendency' in Turkey. Aside from the fact that this is only 22 out of 100, a more important fact should be mentioned: Islamist party votes are of a *protest* nature rather than an Islamist nature. The former nature

is clearly visible, first, in the social class of the voters, and second, in the geographical location from where these votes came. As a matter of fact, they came mainly from those strata who have never been able to go beyond the semi-feudal – semi-capitalist relations: lower middle class masses or small shopkeepers. These people are barely able to make a living, and their situation has been worsening during the last twenty years because of the process of globalization.⁶⁴ As its economic situation is worsened by the transition from national capitalism to international capitalism, and as it strongly resents the new culture (fashion shows, erotic movies on TV, and so on), this stratum feels even more threatened by the coming MP. Therefore, it is extremely receptive to slogans like 'Just Order' and, devoid of political consciousness, it sees its salvation in going back to the 'good old days'. So, to feel secure, it votes for parties like *Refah*, *Fazilet*, and *MHP*⁶⁵ that use a heavy Islamic discourse in remembrance of the past.

As for the other criterion (geographical location), these votes come from two distinct socio-geographical locations. One of these is southeastern Turkey, where a series of 'Kurdish' parties (*DEP*, *HEP*, *HADEP*) were closed or banned from participating in the elections; the other is the suburban slums of giant urban conglomerates like Istanbul, where people react to three-digit inflation and to the showy extravagances of a 'happy minority'.

b) The elite of the Islamist parties. The ideological origin of this elite can be found in the Islamic sects, while its socio-economic origin lies in what has already been called the 'Anatolian capital'. These two categories fit on top of the other and form one of the most important characteristics of the Islamist parties in Turkey.

The term 'Anatolian capital' first began to be heard in the mid-1960s, when it was centered mainly around Eskişehir and declared itself for 'independent' national capitalism and against international capitalism, entry to the European Common Market included. This capital was in no way Islamist by then. As mentioned above, the second and almost simultaneous stage started when Professor Necmettin Erbakan became president of TOBB (Union of Chambers and Stock Markets of Turkey) in 1969. Erbakan rapidly became the spokesman for Anatolian small businessmen and was subsequently to erect several Islamist parties supported by them. The 'Anatolian Tigers' began to emerge as President Özal's economic policies made it possible for Anatolian small and medium businesses to get soft loans and emerge as a rival to Istanbul big business.⁶⁶

This capital that in time came to be called 'Green capital' or 'Islamist capital' was mainly represented by MÜSIAD,⁶⁷ which had a strong

Islamist ideology with all the due discourse and action: anti-Semitism, the sponsorship of Islamic student dormitories and of foundations propagating the idea that sovereignty belongs to God instead of to the nation, and so on. It was very 'nationalistic', and very much against globalization and everything this concept has stood for: modernization, liberal attire, secular law and order, and so on. This was when this capital had to pass through the export companies of Istanbul big business.

In this context, Islam had for the 'Anatolian Tigers' a social, economic and political significance and rationale that far exceeded the conditioning of the religious atmosphere they had absorbed in their small native agrarian towns. First, Islam enabled MÜSIAD to influence the state, itself also very much influenced by the religious discourse and atmosphere. Second, and more importantly, Islam enabled MÜSIAD to draw the support of the masses in its fight against a much stronger TÜSIAD. In that sense, Islam was for MÜSIAD an instrument of fighting a class struggle rather than a belief. Third, Islamic ideology served as a perfect shield on different occasions. For example, a holding company from Konya (a province known as one of the Islamic strongholds) that had bought a hotel in Cappadocia (a tourist region in central Turkey) during the privatization of the official TURBAN (Tourism Bank), returned it to the seller shortly after the purchase on the grounds that the hotel was built on a Greek Orthodox cemetery. It could not possibly afford the 'sacrilege of serving alcoholic drinks on such a site'.⁶⁸

In due time, however, the 'Anatolian Tigers' discovered that they could reach foreign markets on their own initiative, and this was the beginning of a series of very important change in the attitudes of MÜSIAD. As this capital began to articulate with international capitalism and grow in importance (its assets were evaluated as exceeding some US\$40 bn),⁶⁹ MÜSIAD began quitting its strong Islamist attitude. On the one hand, it radically changed its anti-Semitic attitude. Its governing board was present at the cocktails given by the Israeli Consul General of Istanbul on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Israel's foundation in May 1998 simply because this country had become a very important economic and strategic partner of Turkey since 1997. On the other hand, MÜSIAD began, after a certain while, clearly to disavow the 'Islamist capital': its new president, A. Bayramoglu (replacing the previous president, Erol Yarar, who was famous for declaring, 'Islamists are never terrorists', and who in November 1999 broke up his 15-year marriage to marry a young Bosnian fashion model)⁷⁰ stated that the (Islamist) holding companies should not make use of religious symbols while trading.⁷¹ Later, MÜSIAD took the formal decision that the name of Islam could not be used to sell shares.⁷² Furthermore, MÜSIAD discharged Fadil

Akgündüz, a well known Islamist holding owner, and warned several others, forcing some to resign their membership.⁷³

Aside from MÜSIAD, *Refah* began to change once in power. It extended the mandate of Operation Provide Comfort-2,⁷⁴ had to sign a new military agreement with Israel, declared Turkey ready for the European Union, stuck to a high interest rates policy, and sent one of its important members (Abdullah Gül) to the US so that it would be recognized as a moderate party.

The *Fazilet* Party, which replaced *Refah* as the latter was closed down by the Constitutional Court, showed the very same trend: It declared that *Refah's* slogan 'Just Order' would no longer be used because it was 'misunderstood'. Reminded by the interviewer that Erbakan had said that the state would become the co-owner of private factories under this 'Just Order', Recai Kutan (leader of the party) laughed and replied, 'It was [an] intellectual exercise. Anyway, Professor Erbakan himself did nothing to put it into practice when he was prime minister'.⁷⁵ Mukadder Basegmez, one of its well known representatives in the parliament, was to declare later, 'our grudge against Israel is over'.⁷⁶

In the meantime, the sons and daughters of these Islamists had also begun to change. Newspapers reported that Professor Erbakan's teenage son, who wore Versace ties and socks and who drove a Mercedes CL 500 Coupe, had bumped into someone's vehicle and that his bodyguard had quickly replaced him at the wheel before the police had arrived because he had no driving license yet. By the year 2000, beauty parlours were opened for Islamist women, who now began to attend fashion shows specially organized for them. The use of alcohol-free perfumes abounded, as the Islamist youth who formerly loathed female voices in music began to attend 'Green Pop' concerts.⁷⁷ One of my students who wore the 'turban' and didn't shake hands with men was mad at her father because when she wanted to change her car, he bought her a new Turkish-made Fiat instead of a Japanese car as he had originally promised her.

On the other hand, the newspapers disclosed that the administrators of the *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı* (the already mentioned foundation set up by the DRA), while going on their last pilgrimage to Mecca, used as an official car a Chevrolet Chevy One GMS, worth US\$120,000 and equipped with a TV, a video, a refrigerator, beds and two air conditioners.⁷⁸

Commenting about these important changes, one sincere Islamist told me, 'They are having fun like capitalists. They have become normal capitalists. We would have expected them to be Muslim capitalists'.

3) *Globalization*. This phenomenon is slowly but steadily destroying, as it does for every nation-state, the foundations of nationalism (Kemalism). Economically, statism and import substitution have passed away since 1980 and with it, of course, is passing away all the mentality of nationalism. The 'Domestic Products Week', celebrated in primary schools since the 1930s to promote domestic products against imports, is still being celebrated, but it is now a kind of joke because the kids, instead of bringing to school traditional local food (like hazelnuts, raisins, figs, and so on) to eat together, now bring imported Chiquita bananas and kiwis.

In Turkey, there are two groups that take the greatest profit out of the new order of things created by globalization.

a) The 'corner-turners'⁷⁹ and the Mafia. This category, which barely existed before Turkey entered the era of globalization, has become the 'rule' today. Today, money and private interest have taken the lead among the 'rising values' of the youngsters (the 'Özal Youth'), and the Mafia has conquered key positions in the state apparatus as the undeclared war between the state and the PKK made southeastern Turkey a drug smuggling paradise.⁸⁰

On the other hand, this category can of course be ignored from the point of view of our study here because, as has already been stated in the Introduction, it is only natural that at any time in history personal interest has been a major incentive for everybody. But it is also a fact that no cohesion ideology ever pointed to it as its FSL. I mentioned it here to underline the fact that the chaos introduced by globalization favoured this category particularly, as always happens when the mode of production changes (consider also the chaos in the US at the end of nineteenth century – the transition from capitalism to monopoly capitalism – or in today's Russia – the transition from communism to international capitalism).

b) The grand bourgeoisie. The outgoing mode of production (national capitalism) and its cohesion ideology (nationalism) succeeded in building a 'national' bourgeoisie, and this bourgeoisie is now looking forward to articulating with international capitalism (globalization) in order to be able to compete on the domestic and global market. It is mainly represented by TÜSIAD and is definitely in favour of entering the European Union and of everything that goes with globalization.

In this respect, a further inquiry into TÜSIAD itself is revealing. This important body was very conservative until the 1990s. It had even been the main force behind the fall of the social democrats (Ecevit was at the

time a social democrat) in 1979 by publishing full-page criticisms in large-selling newspapers of the day. It had also strongly backed up, during the period 1970–90, anti-communist and pro-fascist forces definitely imbued with an Islamic ideology.

As mentioned above, the very same TÜSIAD was to publish in January 1997 an extremely important document entitled 'Democratization Perspectives in Turkey', in which it declared itself to be definitely in favour of modern human rights and freedoms as professed by the West. The report asked, among others, that the ban on Kurdish language be lifted, *Imam-Hatip* schools be limited, and lessons of religion be no longer compulsory.³¹ The document, severely criticized by MÜSIAD as 'unnecessary and untimely',³² also drew some criticism from right-wing circles of big business. But the fact that TÜSIAD stood firmly behind it, and has further commissioned other similar reports since, points to a striking issue. The grand bourgeoisie, much like the military, now seems to have saved itself from the *paranoia of communism*. But at the same time, this also shows that it has decided that adopting the superstructure of globalization (human and minority rights, and democracy) is now the *prerequisite* for its articulation with international capitalism, the infrastructure of globalization.

It is also important to note that the president of the all-important TISK (Employers' Union of Turkey), Refik Baydur, is today one of the foregoing opponents of the Islamic movement in Turkey. The very same TISK had been, in 1982, directly responsible for the introduction of compulsory courses of religion in the constitution.

CONCLUSION: IS TURKEY GOING ISLAMIST?

Turkey had made the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 through the revolution from above of Kemalism. But without being able to complete successfully her nation-building process, she now suddenly enters phase 3 (globalization). What is going to happen now? Is Turkey, as suggested by some people, going to make a 'backwards transition' and espouse the old Islamic ideology she had some 75 years ago, or is she going to make a 'forward transition' to globalization?

1) Those who still hold the reins of the state apparatus (civil and especially military bureaucracy) are very much against Islam as an ideology leading the public life. Furthermore, the stronger component of the ruling class (the grand bourgeoisie) is very much against Islamic order, and the weaker component ('Anatolian capital') seems to pay only lip service to Islam while quickly articulating with the infrastructure of

globalization. This is because both of them look forward to making a transition from the outgoing MP that created them (national capitalism) to the next MP (international capitalism), which will take them even further.

2) *Refah's* (or *Fazilet's*) reaction votes clearly show, within an incomplete model of nation-building, their reaction to globalization in a religious form.

In the light of these two points, the answer to the above question is 'no'. The real challenger of Kemalism is not Islam, but globalization.

Of course, this strong reaction in religious form will continue for quite a while yet, at least as long as the actual income distribution does not improve somehow. On the contrary, it could become much stronger if the Islamists were not matched in two fields: education and finance. But from there, one should not try to assume that Turkey could end up like Pakistan and Iran, not only because Turkey became a prominent part of the Western system of evolution by passing from phase 1 to phase 2, but also because Pakistan and Iran had never really gone beyond phase 1.

NOTES

1. 'Dominant group' for classless societies or societies in which classes are not fully structured yet, and 'ruling class' for 'modern' class societies.
2. But it must be pointed out that, to be accepted by the society at large, this CI must also provide acceptable solutions to the needs and expectations of the masses.
3. In this phase 1, the particularities of the 'eastern societies' – especially those of the Ottoman Empire – should be taken into consideration, where, in sharp contradistinction with the western societies, a strong state dominates a fragmented religion.
4. It should also be kept in mind that religion (Christianity) was the only common denominator of a feudal society composed of a multitude of immensely varied agricultural entities, called 'manor'.
5. For the sake of simplicity, this transitory phase is omitted in Table 1.
6. 'Robespierre has been to Rousseau, what Lenin has been to Marx'. For the best account of this story, see Royal Institute of International Affairs (1963): *Nationalism, A Report*, 2nd edn., London: Frank Cass, p.30.
7. Globalization is a much-discussed concept and therefore, unlike feudalism, capitalism and communism, it needs further evaluation.

Globalization can best be defined as the *expansion of the Western system, carrying with it both its infrastructure (capitalism) and superstructure (rationalism, secularism, human and minority rights, democracy, and so on)*.

Globalization today is actually the third. There have been two previous waves, both corresponding to the contemporaneous needs of capitalism. 1) Globalization of the 1490s: geographical discoveries necessitated by the trade policies of the mercantilist period that resulted in what we call 'colonialism'. 2) Globalization of the

1890s: Western expansion required by the needs of the Industrial Revolution's monopoly stage (cheap flow of raw materials, new markets, new territories to increase the marginal productivity of the capital, new lands for the excess population, and so on); in short, what we call 'imperialism'. The first globalization was naturally weak; the second was much stronger and paved the way for the third, which is actually its continuation after a break of some 50 years, a break mainly due to the Soviet Union and its ideology.

This third globalization has been created by three successive and complementing developments that have taken place during the last thirty years: the advent of multinational companies in the 1970s; revolutionary developments in communications in the 1980s; and the fall of the Soviet system in the 1990s. The first development enlarged the marketplace to embrace the whole globe now (hence, 'globalization'). The second development made it possible to conquer the minds of people instead of their country (and that made it very difficult to challenge the conquest this time). The third practically gave the West monopolistic control over international developments, political as well as economic.

It is very important here to underline once more the fact that this radical change in the concept of territory (the marketplace shifting from the nation-state to the globe) will have two very important effects on people all over the world. First, the concept of 'motherland' is now bound to change, along with the concept of territory: when it changes, everything else changes for the individual in due time. Second, the Table that portrays the process of European history is now bound to reflect world history as well, at least starting from its phase 3, because globalization is transforming the whole world into a reflection of the West.

8. Between sub-identity and loyalty and between upper-identity and supreme loyalty another symmetry can be detected: The former two are related to primary groups (family, and so on); the individual is born with them (objective identity). On the other hand, the latter two are, in the final analysis, selected/accepted by the individual (subjective identity).
9. The same rule goes for the personal field also. An individual may feel loyalty towards many concepts/sub-identities (family, profession, political party, and so on), just as one may have many hats or may like many men/women at a time. But one can have only one head or can fall in love only with one man/woman at a time.
10. In this context, the concept of 'death penalty' through the ages is also revealing. Every CI has so far punished by death penalty any assault on its FSL, be it by burning alive the 'heretic', by sending the 'traitor' to the firing squad, or by 'purging' the 'people's enemy'.
11. Religion can be one of the founding elements of the nation, even the most important of them all as is the case with Israel, but that is something else. It is the Israeli nation that makes the laws through electing its parliament and if the majority of this nation decides it needs more laws honouring the Jewish religion, it will elect a new parliament to change the government to do so. But the maker of the laws governing the nation is not the God of the Jews, or more concretely the Rabbis that represent the Jewish God. It is the Knesset. The difference between the two is unbridgeable: people can change the power if the assumed source of mandate is the nation; an election suffices. But one cannot change the power if its assumed source of mandate is God. Therefore, democracy of any sort is impossible in theocracy.
- On the other hand, if a parliament were to change the laws to declare the religious law as the law of the land, then the source of the mandate for power is no longer the nation, but God. At this very moment, however, the 'right of resistance' mentioned in the 1789 Declaration should be expected to step in, as a power given by God cannot be changed by any other means.
12. The same crisis situation is also true in individual relations: Remember the good woman (Meryl Streep) in 'Bridges of Madison County', torn between her family and the irresistible stranger (Clint Eastwood).

13. Internal dynamics can manifest itself in two ways. First, a 'revolution from below' can happen. This one is made by the economically dominant class(es) against the politically dominant class(es), such as the 1789 French Revolution made by the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy. Second, transition can happen by a peaceful evolution process, as exemplified by Great Britain or Japan. In contradistinction with the former, the latter transition keeps the traditions ('superstructure') of the old MP.
14. As portrayed in the movie 'Mad Max'. The rule is to evolve forward, both for the individual and the society. For example, a woman divorced because her husband beats her up will never marry a man who maltreats her unless she dies of hunger and so on.
15. External dynamics can manifest themselves in two ways also. First, the society in question may be faced by a 'revolution from above', that is, a modernizing (Westernizing) revolution made by a Westernized elite against the dominant class(es) of the actual MP. In this case, the MP remains the same at least in the beginning, but the elite will try to impose the FSL of the superior phase it purports to represent. Second, the country may be occupied by a foreign power representing a superior phase (colonization), or it may at least come under the heavy influence of the latter (semi-colonization). In this case, the MP also remains the same at least in the beginning, but the policies or influence of the colonizing power will come seriously to challenge, through its direct administration or the Westernized elite, the FSL of the actual MP.
16. Of course, 'forward transition' here does not necessarily mean a better life for the (colonial) society composed mainly of disadvantaged strata. This is, anyway, the whole mechanism behind the 'peripherization' of the Third World.
17. The sultan-caliph had to obtain the *fatwa* of the Sheik ul Islam on a matter involving the Islamic order (*sharia*), and the latter included almost any worldly matter as Islam governed temporal as well as spiritual realms. However, the Empire was far from being theocratic for two solid reasons. Besides the fact that many provisions of Islamic law were never or very seldom applied (for instance, *recm* – the public killing of the adulterer/adulteress by throwing stones, still prevalent today in Saudi Arabia and Iran – was applied only twice during 600 years, and the hand-cutting of thieves was unheard of), the *Mecelle* enacted after the Westernizing *Tanzimat* movement (1839) was meant to be applied to persons of all religions and confessions although it was based on Islamic law. On the other hand, the multi-religious Ottoman society considered at large, the multi-legal system had been there since at least 1454 because of the 'Millet System'. Second, in any case, it would be very difficult to call the Empire 'theocratic' because the *fatwa*-giver Sheik ul Islam could be dismissed by the sultan anytime, and the latter could very well have him executed by the *fatwa* of the new Sheik ul Islam. This came from the very fact that the Ottoman Empire was, as in many other things, a carbon copy of the Byzantine Empire as far as the relations between religion and state were concerned. As a matter of fact, the expression 'Caesarism', meaning the supremacy of the state over religion, is a legacy of Byzantium.
18. While both refer to *reason* instead of *faith* as the basis of temporal affairs, 'laic' (from *laicus*, non-clerical) is an attribute of the state while 'secular' (from *seculum*, age, therefore contemporary) is an attribute of the society.

In countries that never experienced feudalism (the US, for example) or in those where feudalism definitely withered away (Great Britain and France, among others) the society is *secular*. Religion is no longer the cohesion ideology and therefore it no longer bids for temporal power. As a result, the state does not need to pursue a 'laicist' policy, that is, to suppress the proponents of religious law and order. The religious domain is autonomous.

In those countries where the MD is still more or less dominated by the remnants of feudalism, the society is not yet secular and the proponents of religious law still bid for power. In these countries, the state set up by the Westernized elite pursues a *laicist* policy that will most likely resort to the use of some sort of force ('revolution from above') to keep the state and the society away from the influence of religious law and order. In this model, religion is under the close control of the laic state. Here, laicism

does not only mean the opposite of theocracy (many Muslim states are far from being religious ones: Syria, Iraq and so on); it also means being in open conflict with the idea of law and order emanating from God, and practically fighting it. The most typical example of these is Kemalist Turkey, where 'laicism', with a prominent place in the constitution, is considered the backbone of the state.

19. Besides the fact that these insurgencies had become, at a given moment, a real internecine war in Anatolia, the all-important religious factor had entered the game on the side of the sultan-caliph. It was somehow easier to fight against the Greeks, 'invading infidels' and old 'subjects', but it was more difficult to overcome Istanbul's propaganda, based mainly on key-words still used today by the religious and anti-communist discourse: 'incestuous Bolsheviks', 'lackeys of infidels' and also 'freemasons' (because the Young Turks were so considered – as a matter of fact many of them were members of a Masonic lodge). It should also be remembered that the 'volunteer' armies of the sultan had 'raised the *Sandjak-i Sherif*' (the religious green flag symbolizing the opening of the *jihad*, the Holy War on infidels), that Sheikh ul Islam Dürrizade had issued a *fatwa* condemning the nationalists, and that Kemal himself had been condemned to death *in absentia*.
20. This process was the legacy of *Ittihat ve Terakki* (Union and Progress), the Young Turks' political party. As a matter of fact, this nationalist party to which belonged all the leaders of the young republic including Kemal, started many of the republic's nationalist and Westernizing reforms, especially after 1913, with the important exception of the abolition of the caliphate and the declaration of the republic.
21. This type of nationalism, born as a reaction to imperialism, had three aims/functions: independence, modernization (Westernization), and the building of a 'positive identity'. The second function can be divided into political modernization (nation-building and state-building), economic modernization (development through national capitalism), and cultural modernization (Westernizing reforms). The third function was the result of the contradiction between the first (getting rid of the West) and the second (the reintroduction of the West) functions. See Oran, Baskin (1999): *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, resmi ideoloji dışı bir inceleme* (Kemalist Nationalism, a non-official interpretation), 5th edn., Ankara: Bilgi.
22. This motto still figures in large characters above the chair at the GNA. On the other hand, Kemal no doubt profited a lot from the double meaning of 'nation'. This term that had earlier meant *umma* (religious community) had come to mean, in the last days of the Ottoman Empire, 'nation' in the Western sense, its sole meaning today. Professor Erbakan, founder of several religious parties, used the same tactic exactly the other way around from the 1970s onwards.
23. This was the end of the Ottoman Empire; on 17 November, the sultan had to escape from Istanbul on a British war vessel. This was also the separation of the temporal and spiritual powers (the sultanate and the caliphate), and it weakened them both. The new caliph was chosen by the GNA.
24. This was only a 'reaffirmation' because the unnamed republic had been there ever since 'national sovereignty' was pronounced.
25. Each of the three moves was accomplished by a law of the GNA, not by a *fatwa* or anything alike.
26. All that are mentioned above were deadly blows to orthodox (official) Islam.
27. This was a blow to heterodox (popular) Islam.
28. This law reform meant a series of very important changes: a definite rupture with Islamic law, the end of the multi-legal Ottoman system, and the introduction of the European secular law system based on rationalism, national sovereignty and capitalism. The law reform's importance came, above all, from the very fact that it was a major instrument of social transformation used by the Kemalist revolution from above. Tanör, Bülent (1997): *Kuruluş* (The Foundation), Istanbul: Cumhuriyet, pp.59–64).
29. This was a deadly blow to the *hodjas'* monopoly on reading and writing, and its outcome (if not its ultimate purpose) was to sever ties with the Ottoman cultural past.

30. The other 'arrows' were republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism and reformism.
31. These two societies were entrusted with the duty to build the all-important historical and linguistic foundations of the new Turkish nation. The Historical Society's purpose was to go to the Central Asian roots of the Turks, over the shoulder of the Muslim-Ottoman period. The Linguistic Society's purpose was to 'purify' the language from Ottoman words. These were therefore key institutions *par excellence* of the new cohesion ideology, nationalism. (In short, this was a 'Back to the Future' operation!).
32. Karpat, Kemal (1967): *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaası, p.53, n.67 (the original is in English: *Turkey's Politics, the transition to a multi-party system*, Princeton, NJ, 1959).
33. This Kemalist revolution from above was rendered possible mainly by four factors, the first three being created by internal, and the fourth by external dynamics:
 - a) The nature of Islam: unlike Christianity in the West, Islam had no established clergy (church); it was disunited from the very beginning, with *Shia* and *Sunna* constituting what we call 'orthodox' (official) religion, and a multitude of sects and orders (*tarikats*) as 'heterodox' religion; and peasant masses in the Ottoman Empire had never been bigots.
 - b) Laicism, contrary to general opinion, was not imported from the West (see fn.17).
 - c) The Kemalists had just emerged triumphant from the war of national liberation fought in a very desperate medium against the 'former subjects and infidel invaders'.
 - d) Kemalist revolution was made in an exceptional atmosphere of 'relative autonomy of the state', to which the existence of the Soviet state also contributed. The Western powers, preoccupied with both the 1929 Depression and the Nazi-Fascist threat, were unable to turn their attention to the Anatolian Revolution, and Kemalism was able to strengthen its state and build its nation. It must also be said that the Westernizing ideology of Kemalist nationalism was in no way in conflict with Western interests.

On the other hand, the Kemalist revolution had two great disadvantages. First, for several reasons, there had never been a separation of the spiritual and temporal powers/worlds in Islam; and second, there was no bourgeoisie to support the revolution against feudalism.

34. This religious form came from several sources. First, the nationalists' anti-clerical measures were much resented in an agrarian society almost completely Muslim. Second, since the Ottoman Empire, Westernization (Western = infidel) had not only done nothing to improve the situation of the masses, it had, on the very contrary, always been hand in hand with the drastic impoverishment of the masses, because it had always been adopted as a last solution during periods of great difficulty. So, when the poor masses came across a measure they considered as Westernization, they had always shown a religious reaction as an almost 'Pavlovian reflex'. Third, these Westernizing measures coincided with the 1929 Depression. As impoverishment grew, masses came to consider religion as the only 'salvation'.

- On the other hand, it should be remembered that religious reaction is the standard popular form of protest whenever or wherever the cohesion of a society is 'disturbed' by modernization. Kimbanguism (1921) and Matswanism (1930) are striking cases in point in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly in the Ottoman Empire, when the centralizing efforts of the sultan in the mid-nineteenth century plunged the Kurdish population into chaos by destroying Kurdish tribal leaders' principalities, the Kurds started a series of uprisings in 1880 using religious jargon, the last of which took place in 1925 during the republic. This last uprising was definitely the work of the secret revolutionary organization, *Azadi*, founded by secular Kurdish officers of the Turkish army, but it nonetheless used religious arguments and was unavoidably led by a sheik, Sheik Said.
35. This policy had already been largely applied by Prime Minister Demirel (President of the Republic 1993-2000) against the left ever since 1970s. But what is interesting to note is that this was exactly the same policy that was applied in Algeria as well.

36. This was a joint proposal of the Employers' Union of Turkey (TISK) and the Union of Chambers of Agriculture. The first represented the grand bourgeoisie of Istanbul, the second the petty bourgeoisie of Anatolia.
37. These two institutions were until then associations endowed by Atatürk's testament. The generals' unbelievable move was to transform them into official institutions, transfer their income to the state, and therefore indirectly cancel Atatürk's testament. The fact that this was also done to enable the Turkish Bank of Affairs (*Türkiye İş Bankası*) to increase its capital (the bank was unable to do so because, according to the testament, the two associations had the usufruct of Atatürk shares and the CHP (Republican People's Party, closed by the junta) had the property right) is another interesting point highlighting the relationship between the financial world and the junta.
38. *Aydinlik*, 14 Dec. 1993.
39. Yakup Kepenek, *Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 2000.
40. *Sabah*, 11 Nov. 1999.
41. *Milliyet*, 17 Oct. 1995.
42. *Sabah*, 13 Feb. 1997.
43. *Aydinlik*, 23 July 1994.
44. *Milliyet*, 19 July 1999.
45. *Milliyet*, 17 Oct. 1995.
46. Deniz Som, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 June 1998.
47. *Cumhuriyet*, 17 Nov. 1994. A survey conducted by Gallup among the *Imam-Hatip* students showed that they were more pious and conservative than the average *Refah* ('prosperity') Party voter. 80 per cent of them asked for Islamic law to be included in the present law system (against 61 per cent among *Refah* voters), 86 per cent of them asked for alcoholic beverages to be prohibited (against 74 per cent among *Refah* voters), and only 20 per cent declared they would like to become a prayer leader. See *Cumhuriyet*, 1 April 1997.
48. This privatization programme brought in, as of the beginning of 1998, US\$4.2 bn while the state's expenditure to collect this money amounted to US\$3.9 bn, *Cumhuriyet*, 30 Oct. 1997.
49. When Özal took the reins of economic policy in 1980, US\$1 was worth 35 TL. In November 2000, US\$1 was worth over 676,000 TL. Inflation rose from 22 per cent in 1982 to 99 per cent in 1997, with a peak inflation rate of 125 per cent in 1994. Figures of the State Institute of Statistics, cited in *Capital Infocard*, April 1998, p.1. In November 2001, the value of US\$ had reached over 1,500,000 TL.
50. Real wages in manufacturing industry declined by 30 per cent between 1977 and 1988. In 1994, the per capita national income of the richest 20 per cent of the population was \$5,932, while the poorest 20 per cent received \$530. Also in 1994, the richest 20 per cent of the population received 55 per cent of the disposable income in Turkey, while the poorest 20 per cent received five per cent. *Capital Infocard*, p.6.
51. Bribery in administration was symbolized, enhanced and also 'legalized' by what Özal said as prime minister: 'My public servant knows what to do!'
52. These towns had always been the most conservative places in Turkey, as is the case all over the world. Islam had never been strictly observed in villages but had always been very important in these small towns.
53. These Anatolian businessmen were, at the beginning of the 1980s, paying large commissions to these holding companies to export their products, but they soon discovered that learning the techniques of export would be more profitable, and went into foreign trade for themselves.
54. So far, Professor Erbakan has founded (or has been responsible for the foundation of) four religious fundamentalist political parties. The first, MNP (*Millî Nizam Partisi*, National Order Party), lived between 1969 and 1971, when it was closed by the Constitutional Court. The second, MSP (*Millî Selamet Partisi*, National Salvation Party) lived between 1972 and 1980 and was closed, along with other parties, by the

12 September 1980 Junta. The third, RP (*Refah Partisi*; Prosperity Party) lived between 1983 and 1998 and was closed by the Constitutional Court (see below). The fourth, FP (*Fazilet Partisi*; Virtue Party) was founded in 1997 just before the closure of *Refah*, and was also closed by the Constitutional Court in 2000.

55. Caused by Özalist economics and by the undeclared war in the southeast, this migration to the big cities created and fortified in the suburbs large slum areas that the big city could in no way assimilate. This ever increasing mass of underdogs, that witnessed all the splendour (and, more importantly, all the extravagances) of the metropolis without the tiniest hope of enjoying it, was to go in two opposite directions: into a pool from which the Mafia and the PKK drew their militants; and into a generator of votes for Islamist parties.
56. It was the DYP's leader, Tansu Çiller, who brought Erbakan to power by agreeing to be his coalition partner, although a few months ago she had tried to obtain the support of Western leaders by playing the fundamentalist threat card precisely represented by *Refah*. A professor of economics well known in the 'high society' circles of Istanbul, she was educated at Istanbul Robert College and in the US, and she made, in conjunction with her husband (who, by the way, took her last name when they married), an immense – and obscure – wealth both before and after entering politics. Her price was to assure *Refah* votes in the Parliament against the lifting of her legislative immunity with a view to investigating her wealth. In the meantime, she discovered the advantages of using Islamist jargon and she would on various occasions put on a scarf and use slogans like those of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: 'The Flag Will Not Come Down, The *Exan* Will Not Stop'. She also frequently recited a prayer before making a public speech. Her financial situation is still the subject of much public discussion.
57. These sects and orders had been officially closed, along with the *tekkes*, in November 1925. The religious outfits worn by the sheiks in this banquet were those forbidden, in the 1920s, for wear outside of worship places.
58. Report by the Western Working Group, founded by the General Staff of the Armed Forces to study the phenomenon of Islamism in Turkey, *Cumhuriyet*, 21 July 1998.
59. A constitutional body, in theory 'advisory' but in fact very influential because of the heavy influence of the military. It is composed of top military commanders and some cabinet members.
60. This was put into written form in the so-called 'National Policy Document' published by the National Security Council in October 1997. The document declared its struggle with 'secessionist and religious fundamentalist movements of equal and primary priority', and it also denounced the 'Racist Mafia' and said 'local and cultural particularities could be developed on condition that they did not interfere with the public sphere'. See *Hürriyet*, 4 Nov. 1997.
61. This was the most important blow to the Islamists, because Islamist cadres were carefully raised in these schools, which had incomparably better schooling conditions than any other state school (small classes, computerized teaching, developed language and science laboratories, and so on), thanks of course, to very generous private (Islamist) donations. The 'first three years' were of crucial importance, because sending a 14-year-old child to a school giving Islamic/Islamist education was not as easy (and instrumental) as sending him there at 11. This very fear was openly voiced by *Refah* leaders when they declared that a '14-year-old student may no longer want to go to a *Imam-Hatip*' (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 Aug. 1997). This is why the Islamists kept on demonstrating in the streets following the Friday prayer.

The fear of the Islamists came true after 1997. As a result of this '8-year education', the number of *Imam-Hatip* schools fell from 605 to 604 for the very first time in 1999 (this number had risen from 448 to 561 in 1995, to 601 in 1996, and to 605 in 1997). On the other hand, the YÖK (Institution on Higher Learning) decided that those students choosing to continue their higher education in the same field as their high school would get extra points in the university entrance exam. This was

- detrimental to *Imam-Hatip* students who were planning, instead of going to the Theology Seminar or becoming *imams*, to go to schools preparing them for high civil administration (such as the School of Political Science in Ankara, and also law schools). Therefore, these youngsters began to quit *Imam-Hatip* schools to go to regular high schools. Enrolment to *Imam-Hatips* fell by 75 per cent in 1999 (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 March 1999), and at the university entrance exams no *Imam-Hatip* high school made it to the Top 100 list and only 9 *Imam-Hatips* were able to make it to the Top 500 list (*Milliyet*, 26 July 1999). It is now being calculated that the number of *Imam-Hatip* students will decrease from 192,786 to only 24,749 by the year 2004 (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Dec. 1999).
62. It is just like the parents in Central Asia who sent their kids to Russian-medium schools in the USSR. On this matter, see Oran, Baskin (1997): 'Thoughts on the State and the Kurdish Identity in Turkey', in Ole Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yürükel (eds.), *Contrasts and Solutions in the Middle East*, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, p.489-99.
 63. It is very significant to underline that in this 'fight' between the car stickers, two very different languages are used, although both slogans are written in Turkish and use the Latin alphabet.
 64. In Turkey, this joke is very revealing in this context: 'Brave Grocery of the Corner vs the Supermarket'. It perfectly refers to the destructive effects of globalization over small shopkeepers, fastening their slide towards fundamentalism.
 65. The fact that MHP (ultra nationalist, Pan-Turkist) doubled its votes in the April 1999 elections is also owing to a strong reaction against armed Kurdish nationalism (PKK).
 66. For example, a local Anatolian company in XXX (a so-far insignificant central Anatolian town) is now manufacturing army trousers for the German army. This evolution was made possible by an allocation of public funds in a very advantageous way to the Anatolian businessmen. In the period 1990-96, 54.5 per cent of these were allocated to Anatolian 'small and medium businesses' mainly producing cotton thread, while the regions containing the great majority of the population (like Istanbul, a city of some 10 million people) received 46.6 per cent. These figures are taken from a research by Mustafa Sönmez published in *Forum* magazine (July 1997) on TOBB; quoted by Ali Bayramoglu, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 2 Sept. 1997.
 67. The very choice of the acronym MÜSIAD is revealing in this context. Although the 'M' represents 'Müstakil' (independent), everybody interprets it as 'Müslüman' (Muslim).
 68. *Sabah*, 13 July 1998. It was later reported that the company had asked for a delay of four months to make the payment, at the end of which it disclosed its intention and the 'reason' for it. The bank's officials said that the company already knew about the old cemetery but wanted to return it because of the dramatic falls in bed prices. I should add that the last Greek Orthodox quit Cappadocia in 1923 at the time of the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece.
 69. *Sabah*, 16 Aug. 2000.
 70. *Sabah*, 12 Nov. 1999.
 71. *Milliyet*, 29 Jan. 2000.
 72. *Milliyet*, 8 March 2000.
 73. *Sabah*, 25 Aug. 2000.
 74. It will be remembered that this operation was started in 1991 under the leadership of the US to keep Iraqi Kurds in a safe haven, out of the reach of Saddam Hussein. *Refah*, when it was in opposition, had always been very critical of this military unit of 'imperialist America'.
 75. See interview by Fatih Çekirge, *Sabah*, 11 July 1998.
 76. *Milliyet*, 15 Dec. 1999.
 77. *Milliyet*, 8 Feb. 2000, *Sabah*, 19 March 2000.
 78. *Sabah*, 16 Aug. 2000.
 79. The 'corner-turners' are those who were suddenly enriched through extralegal and/or illegal means consciously created during the Özal era. 'To turn the corner' (to have it made) has a definitely negative connotation in today's Turkish.
 80. The investigations about the *Susurluk* scandal (November 1996), that made the public

suddenly aware of the open secret of Mafia-state relations in Turkey, has led nowhere as of November 2001 because too many high-ranking statesmen, military and civil bureaucrats, and politicians, the 'Deep State', were deeply involved in the corruption. (The scandal was about the outcome of a shocking traffic accident. Three corpses and a wounded person were found in a recently smashed car. Apart from the dead body of a young fashion model, the corpses belonged to a high-ranking fascist Mafia member, regularly 'used' by 'counter guerrilla' organizations of the state by providing him with various firearms and several special passports and IDs, and a high-ranking police chief. The wounded person was a very famous Kurdish feudal lord, cooperating with the state against the PKK as 'Chief Village Protector', an incumbent parliamentarian in spite of being a long-time convicted murderer of several gendarmes).

81. For this report and other publications of TÜSIAD, see the following website: www.tusiad.org.
82. *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 25 Jan. 1997.